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Abstract
Using a novel data-set of district-wise program expenditure, we estimate the
impact of large employment schemes on agricultural wages in India. Depend-
ing on the underlying theoretical mechanism, private wages can either respond
to contemporaneous uctuations in program expenditure or be sensitive to the
stock of expenditure incurred under such programs. We rst nd that although
program expenditure varied substantially both across and within districts, every
district was covered under employment guarantee during the 2001-2010 period.
Next, we empirically contrast the spotversus the stock e¤ect of employ-
ment schemes on wages. Identication of program impact is achieved by par-
tialling out a host of district and year specic controls. Exploiting the fund
allocation process of these schemes, we further check for potentially endoge-
nous district-year uctuations. We nd a signicant positive impact on wages
through the stock e¤ect. In contrast, we do not nd an immediate jump in
wages suggesting weak spot e¤ects.
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1 Introduction
The recent implementation of National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (hereafter
NREGA), has revitalized the debate on the impact of workfare programs on the
labor market. The program was implemented in three phases and enveloped 200,
330, and all the districts of the country by phase I (2006), II (2007), and III (2008)
respectively. During 2009-2010, NREGA generated around 2.6 billion work-days,
and employed around 55 million households making it the largest public workfare
program in the world. The total expenditure under NREGA amounted to around
0.6% of the GDP (or around 5% of the agricultural output) during the same year. It
is hence important to understand the welfare implications of such large scale policy
interventions on nonparticipants through its impact on short-term manual labor wage
rate. The question is highly policy relevant since such casual labor provides an
important source of income for the poor [Banerjee and Duo (2007)].
This paper starts by documenting the existence of NREGAs predecessor: Sam-
poorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (hereafter SGRY) which was implemented in all the
districts of the country in 2001. To compare the two schemes and for the empirical
analysis, we use a novel data-set of district-wise annual expenditure incurred under
SGRY and NREGA over the ten year period: 2001-2010. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the most exhaustive and disaggregated expenditure data on employment
schemes used in any comparable analysis for a developing country. We nd the two
programs to be strikingly similar in terms of their functionality and general program
objectives.
An important empirical nding of this exercise is that SGRY continued to be
in operation exclusively in the non-NREGA districts during the early phases of
NREGA implementation in 2006 and 2007. This is an important revelation as it
blurs the distinction between treatmentand controldistricts as dened on the
basis of the phase-wise implementation of NREGA.1 In this regard, we motivate the
provision of employment guarantee as a continuous treatment where NREGA can be
best understood as an intensication of an already existing rural workfare policy by
the government.
1This however does not threaten the validity of the results from di¤erence-in-di¤erence framework
used in recent studies as the results can be interpreted as the e¤ect on wages due to the intensication
of employment provision (or program impact) rather than the implementation of a previously non-
existent employment guarantee policy.
2
Theoretically, Ravallion (1990) discusses public works to increase private wages
by increasing the demand for labor or improving the bargaining power of the worker.2
Basu, Chau, and Kanbur (2009) discuss other spot market e¤ectsof Employment
Guarantee Schemes (hereafter EGS) like gains in e¢ ciency that may increase private
wages by alleviating the distortions in the labor market that arise due to oligopsonistic
market power of employers.
Apart from such spot market e¤ects, employment schemes have long been ac-
knowledged to have productivity enhancing e¤ects. That is, the productive assets
created under the employment programs as public capital can increase agricultural
productivity. Binswanger et al. (1993) and Fan et al. (2000) highlight the strong pos-
itive relationship between public infrastructure investment and agricultural output in
India. Drèze (1990) discusses the role of Maharashtras EGS in increasing agricul-
tural productivity in the long run. Similar workfare programs in Bangladesh have
also been commended in increasing agricultural production by increasing and main-
taining rural infrastructure [see for e.g., Alamgir (1983) and Thomas (1990)]. More
recently, Aggarwal et al. (2012) discuss the construction of wells under NREGA as
having productivity enhancing e¤ects in the agriculture sector among other positive
spill-over e¤ects.3
Hence apart from spot market e¤ects like e¢ ciency gains or labor demand e¤ects,
the build up of productive public capital may further increase private wages. Although
our data does not allow us to separately identify the e¤ect due to each channel, one
cannot ignore the possibility of wage increases due to public asset accumulation,
especially since part of the expenditure under both SGRY and NREGA represents an
investment to develop and maintain public infrastructure. In the paper, we provide
evidence that productive works like ood control and irrigation projects were indeed
carried out under both these programs. Since part of the EGS expenditure represents
an investment component which can raise wages by increasing worker productivity,
we use the stock of EGS expenditure as our main explanatory variable to measure the
impact of EGS on wages. We use our novel data-set of district-wise EGS expenditure
over the ten year period from 2001-10 to construct the stock of EGS expenditure.
A concurrent study by Berg et al. (2015) reports signicant increase in wages
2Since our wage data is on agricultural wages, we use the terms private, eld, or agricultural
wages interchangeably in the paper.
3Basu (2013) presents a theoretical model discussing labor market responses to a productive EGS.
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using exposure to NREGA (dened as the number of months a district was un-
der NREGA) as opposed to zero immediate impact using regression di¤erence-in-
di¤erence (DD).4 Although similar in concept to the denition of exposure in Berg
et al. (2015), using the stock of EGS expenditure allows us to account for the substan-
tial district level heterogeneity in the provision of public employment.5 The medical
literature also provides some relevant analogues where under the assumption that a
treatment has long term e¤ects, the treatment impact is based on aggregate (rather
than individual) dose exposures [see for e.g., Chen et al. (2001), Martins-Filho et al.
(2010), Nysom et al. (1998), and Schaubel and Wei (2011)].
The challenge of using the stock of EGS expenditure is that this measure is highly
endogenous and can be strongly correlated with district level characteristics such
as the share of scheduled caste population, baseline agricultural productivity, and
other demographic features like proneness to oods or droughts. As is discussed in
detail in the paper, baseline identication of the program impact is achieved after
partialling out district and year xed e¤ects, di¤erential trends, and other important
controls. For robustness, we further check for potentially endogenous district-year
specic uctuations in EGS expenditure by exploiting the process of fund allocation
in the two schemes. Our results are robust to this and other robustness checks.
To motivate our empirical specication, we present a simple model of asset accu-
mulation that suggests wages to be a non-linear (concave) function of the stock of
EGS expenditure. The model draws heavily from Basu, Chau, and Kanbur (2009)
wherein we allow labor productivity to be increasing in the capital generated under
an EGS in a multi-period dynamic framework. Finally, by constructing an articial
data-set, we conduct a falsication test to show that if increase in wages occur only
due to the spot market e¤ects, then contrary to our empirical results, the stock of
EGS expenditure is irrelevant in explaining private wages.
The concurrent literature on NREGA exploits the phase-wise implementation of
the program to estimate the labor market e¤ects of the program [see Azam (2012),
Berg et al. (2015), and Imbert and Papp (2015)]. The rst contribution of this paper
is to employ a novel data-set of district-wise employment expenditure over 10 years
4Similar to Berg et al. (2015), we do not nd any positive or signicant jump in wages using
regression Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence. See Appendix A2.
5See for e.g., Imbert and Papp (2015), Drèze and Khera (2009), and Drèze and Oldiges (2009)
for a discussion on the large cross-state di¤erences in the provision of public employment under
NREGA.
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that spans NREGA and the workfare program before it. This allows us to account for
the substantial heterogeneity that exists in the provision of public employment under
such schemes, both within and between districts. This enables us to treat the EGS
as a continuous treatment using the stock of expenditure as our explanatory variable.
Second, by comparing results from di¤erent empirical specications, we contrast the
relative strengths of spot market e¤ects and the stock e¤ectof workfare programs.
Similar to Berg et al (2015), we nd no immediate jump in wages which may indicate
weak spot market e¤ects of such schemes. On the contrary, we nd positive and
signicant stock e¤ect of EGS on wages.
Thirdly, based on the empirical evidence that such programs also undertake pro-
ductive public works, we formalize the e¤ect of EGS on wages through increase in
labour productivity. We extend the Basu, Chau, and Kanbur (2009) model by allow-
ing for worker productivity to be increasing in the stock of public capital generated
under the program. This empirically motivates the stock of EGS expenditure as the
variable relevant in capturing the impact of employment schemes on wages. Finally,
using the nancial records gathered as part of the data collected for this study, we
exploit the fund allocation process to supplement our baseline identication of the
EGS impact on wages.
Our results suggest that the annual growth of wages due to employment guaran-
tee schemes is between 2.3-2.9% per annum. This impact is large especially when
compared with the average growth of 3% per annum for the districts in our sample.
Interestingly, we nd similar response of wages under both workfare programs. Our
results specic to NREGAs impact on wages are in general agreement with recent
studies by Azam (2012), Berg et al. (2015), and Imbert and Papp (2015). Zim-
mermann (2012) reports insignicant impact on wages, but the condence intervals
reported in the study are su¢ ciently large to accommodate our results.
The following section discusses and compares SGRY and NREGA in detail. In
section 3, we discuss Basu, Chau, and Kanbur (2009) model of EGS with asset ac-
cumulation. Data is discussed in section 4 while Results are reported in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
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2 NREGA and its predecessor
In this section we discuss NREGA and its predecessor SGRY, which was in operation
from 2001 to 2008 until it was completely subsumed under NREGA. Importantly, we
nd that SGRY was operational in most of the districts that did not receive NREGA
during 2006-2008. This blurs the distinction between treatment and control districts.
Below we discuss and compare SGRY and NREGA.
2.1 SGRY
Provision of unskilled manual labor work on demand (employment guarantee) has
been a tool to combat extreme poverty by the Central government at-least since the
introduction Food for Work program in 1977-78. Maharashtras Employment Guar-
antee Scheme which was introduced in 1972 is an example of a state run employment
guarantee program. Such employment schemes before 2000 were however substan-
tially di¤erent from SGRY and NREGA in the sense that they worked as sub-schemes
for larger rural development programs. Also, the objectives of employment creation
and rural infrastructure development were never comprehensively addressed by a sin-
gle program.6
Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY) was launched as a nationwide pro-
gram on 25th September 2001 to address the issues of employment generation and
rural infrastructure creation. With the introduction of SGRY, previous employment
programs like Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana (JGSY) and Employment Assurance
Schemes (EAS) were discontinued. The motivation to implement SGRY was to in-
tegrate di¤erent programs for wage employment into one universal scheme.7 Like
NREGA, SGRY envisaged generation of wage employment and creation of rural in-
frastructure by provision of labor intensive public projects.8 The program cost was
divided between the Central and State government in the ratio 75:25.
6See Bahal (2015) for a detailed discussed on all major Rural Development Programs in India
since 1980.
7SGRY operated as two streams initially, with program funds being equally distributed between
the two. From 2004-05, SGRY operated as a single program.
8Details regarding the types of rural infrastructure projects undertaken under SGRY and NREGA
are discussed in Section 3.
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2.2 NREGA
NREGA was enacted in September 2005 and the program came into existence from
2006. At present, the program operates in all the districts of the country. NREGA
entitles 100 days of guaranteed unskilled manual work (annually) to every rural house-
hold at the state dened minimum wage. Starting from 2006, the program was imple-
mented in three phases. During 2006, NREGAwas implemented in 200most backward
districts of the country. The criteria of judging the backwardness of a district was
based on measures like agricultural productivity, past agricultural wage level, and the
density of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in a district.9
Additional 130 districts were enveloped into the programs second phase by 2007.
By the third phase in 2008, NREGA was implemented in all the districts of the coun-
try. Like its predecessor, NREGA aims to generate wage employment and develop
rural infrastructure through the provision of public works.
2.3 NREGA as a more intense EGS
This section highlights the similarities between the two schemes and motivates NREGA
as a more intense employment scheme in comparison to SGRY. As Figure 1 shows,
adjusted for 2000 prices, nearly 40 billion Indian rupees were spent on SGRY at the
national level in its rst year in 2001. The expenditure at the national level under
SGRY progressively increased to nearly 60 billion rupees by 2005. In comparison,
the national expenditure under NREGA in 2006 was nearly 70 billion rupees which
substantially increased to 115 billion and 180 billion in 2007 and 2008 respectively.
This increase was primarily due to the scale up of NREGA during its second and
third phases.
Figure 2 shows the annual employment generated under SGRY and NREGA at the
national level in millions of man-days generated. As expected, the trend of employ-
ment generated under the two programs closely matches the aggregate expenditure
trend in Figure 1. Figures 1 and 2 highlight that although at a relatively smaller
scale, signicant amount of expenditure and employment generation did occur under
an employment scheme before NREGA. It is important to mention here that the
9Given that past values of such statistics were used, the index was essentially based on district
specic and time invariant xed e¤ects. This ranking however was not perfectly adhered to during
the implementation of the program because of the substantial political bargaining involved between
the central and state governments.
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overlap of expenditure as seen in Figure 1 during the years 2006 and 2007, does not
imply that both the programs were simultaneously in operation in all the districts.
Rather, SGRY continued to be in operation in only those districts that did not receive
NREGA until 2008.10
This point is clearly highlighted when we compare district-wise expenditure in
2006 in Figures 3a and 3b. Figure 3a shows the rollout of NREGA in its rst phase
in 2006. The non-NREGAor late-phasedistricts are in white while the shaded
districts are the 200 phase I districts. In contrast, Figure 3b, shows the actual
employment expenditure that occurred in the year 2006 which includes the expen-
diture under SGRY. Similarly, Figures 3c and 3d show that even during the phase
II implementation of NREGA in 2007, SGRY was operational in the non-NREGA
districts.
Hence comparison of Figures 3a and 3c with Figures 3b and 3d respectively high-
lights that SGRY continued to be in operation during the early phases of NREGA
(in 2006 and 2007) in the non-NREGA districts. This is an important revelation
as it blurs the distinction between treatmentand controldistricts as dened on
the basis of the phase-wise implementation of NREGA. The absence of any districts
with zero coverageof employment guarantee policy in 2006 and 2007 was a result
of the implementation process of NREGA where the late phase districts were in-fact
supposed to have SGRY operational in them (until NREGA nally enveloped them
in later phases). Chapter III of NREGA (2005) deems SGRY to be the action plan of
the Act for the districts which werent covered under the rst two phases of NREGA
rollout:
...the Annual Action Plan or Perspective Plan for the Sampoorna Grameen Roz-
gar Yojana (SGRY) ... in the concerned area ... shall be deemed to be the action plan
for the Scheme for the purposes of this Act.p.3, NREGA (2005).
Hence, the provision of employment guarantee seems to be a continuous process
for the period of our study, both before and during the phase-wise implementation of
NREGA.
Finally, we compare key features of both the programs to highlight the striking
similarities between the two programs. As Table 1 compares, both programs were
implemented in all of the districts of the country with their primary objectives being
10Only 3 out of around 600 districts reported positive expenditure by both the programs during
2006 and 2007. Results do not change if we drop the concerned districts.
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provision of wage employment and infrastructure creation. Both schemes involved
similar types of labor intensive public works. The program cost was largely borne
by the central government for both the schemes. Finally, both programs encouraged
female workers to join the public works by keeping a minimum female participation
target of 33%.
Hence, apart from the higher expenditure under NREGA, the two programs were
indeed very similar. In this regard, NREGA is best understood as an intensication
of an already existing policy of employment guarantee. An important feature that
may however distinguish NREGA to be structurally di¤erent from SGRY is that
unlike an employment guarantee program (like SGRY) where the demand for work
can be substantially rationed (due to xed budget constraints), NREGA is an Act
where employment guarantee is envisioned as a right. However, such a theoretical
distinction has not precipitated into ground reality.
As Dutta et al. (2012) report, rationing of the demand for work is substantial
even under NREGA. They report a country average rationing rate of nearly 44%
with some states rationing the demand for work to as high as 84% .11 Himanshu
and Sharan (2014) highlight the case of unmet demand in NREGA due to a supply
driven approach and bureaucratic/administrative capacity (or lack thereof). This
further reinstates that NREGA can be viewed as a more intense (but not structurally
di¤erent) scheme relative to SGRY.
3 Model of capital accumulation under an EGS
In this section we motivate worker productivity (and hence private wages) to increase
due to the build-up of productive public capital under an employment guarantee
scheme. We show that under some basic assumptions this motivates private wages
as a non-linear (concave) function of the stock of EGS expenditure.12 However, asset
accumulation may not be the only channel that justies the relevance of using the
stock of EGS expenditure while measuring the impact on eld wages. As a falsication
11Dutta et al. (2012) argue that rationing may as well be unavoidable if the maximum level of
spending under the Act is exogenously xed while the o¤ered wage rate cannot fall below a socially
acceptable minimum wage.
12More generally, the idea that the existing stock of public capital is relevant to increases in
growth and productivity have been discussed in Aschauer (1989), Corsetti (1992), and Futagami
et al. (1993).
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test, we show in Appendix A1 that if EGS impacts private wages only by a¤ecting
the spot market for labor, then (contrary to our empirical ndings) the stock of
EGS expenditure is not relevant in explaining private wages. Therefore, our model
simply aims to highlight a plausible mechanism that may help explain our empirical
results of positive and signicant increase in wages when measured by the stock of
EGS expenditure versus no immediate impact using standard regression di¤erence-
in-di¤erence (see Appendix A2).13
Apart from the creation of wage employment, the schemes studied in our paper
also generate productive durable assets for sustainable rural development. Under both
SGRY and NREGA, the demand for work is met by hiring labor for public works.
These public works involve projects on rural connectivity, ood control and protection,
water conservation, drought proong, micro irrigation, and land development among
other such projects. Under NREGA, high priority projects in water conservation and
water harvesting form the majority of the works undertaken under the scheme. Given
that our wage data pertains to agricultural eld wages, accumulation of such public
capital can indeed increase labor productivity in the agriculture sector and hence be
an important mechanism through which EGS impacts eld wages.
Table 2 provides state-wise summary of the average number of works (in thou-
sands) initiated and completed (annually) over the SGRY and NREGA regimes. Al-
though the available data regarding creation of physical assets under both SGRY
and NREGA is limited to the information on the number of works undertaken and
completed, Table 2 provides evidence that productive works were indeed carried out
under both the schemes without quantifying the number of durable assets generated
under the schemes.14
To motivate a simple reduced form relationship between wages and employment
expenditure in our empirical analysis, we discuss a simplied version of the EGS
model as discussed in Basu, Chau, and Kanbur (2009) (hereafter BCK) by allowing
for worker productivity to be increasing in the stock of EGS capital. Since the public
capital generated under the scheme is not directly observed, we approximate it as
a constant returns to scale function of the EGS expenditure. Below we discuss the
asset accumulation channel by introducing a dynamic framework in the BCK model.
13Although beyond the scope of this study, empirically validating the di¤erent channels through
which an EGS may impact private wages is an important area for future research.
14The di¤erence in the size, scale, and nature of projects under SGRY and NREGA may explain
why the completion rate under NREGA is lower than that of SGRY.
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Workers
There is a unit mass of workers where the utility function of a worker is dened
by: Ut(;wt) = wt  b where wt is the private wage at time t, b is the private sector
specic cost while  is the individual specic cost of working which is supposed
to be uniformly distributed between [0 1]. Both b and  are assumed to be time
invariant. Workers are assumed to supply 1 unit of labor inelastically unless the cost
of employment is higher than the wage earned. Without loss of generality, we can
normalize the workers reservation utility to zero to obtain the following inverse labor
supply relation: wt(lt) = blt for lt  1.
Employers
Since our objective is to highlight the increase in private wages due to the build up
of public capital under an EGS, we switch o¤ spot market e¤ects like gains in e¢ ciency
that are obtained by assuming employers to have oligopsonistic market power as in
BCK.15 The insights obtained from the productivity channel are invariant to the
assumed market power of the employers. We therefore assume that there are a large
number of employers N !1 representing a competitive labor market structure. Like
in BCK, labor is assumed to be the only input of production with a marginal (and
average) value product of labor at while wage wt is the only cost that the employers
incur during production. A representative employer hence maximizes his objective
function: Max
lt
[at   wt] lt: Hence, wage wt is simply equal to the productivity at while
aggregate employment equals at=b.
This invites the same interpretation as in the BCK: aggregate unemployment can
exist if productivity is low enough or the cost of employment is high enough. To
introduce the role of EGS capital in increasing productivity, we dene at as a concave
function of the existing stock of capital generated under the EGS. We are agnostic
about the functional form of capital accumulation under EGS. It is assumed that
the capital stock accumulates every period under an active EGS while the existing
capital depreciates geometrically at the rate 1  . Hence at = a0h(Gt) where h(0) is
normalized to 1; h0() > 0; and h00() < 0 while Gt is the existing stock of EGS capital
at the beginning of period t. Therefore, Gt = gt 1 + gt 2 +    + t 1g0 where gt is
the productive capital generated under the EGS at time t.
15Appendix A1 discusses the role of the stock of EGS expenditure if the increase in wage is solely
due to such gains in e¢ ciency.
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We substitute the unobserved productive capital generated in every period by
approximating it as a constant returns to scale function of the expenditure in year
t: et which is observed for all districts.16 Therefore we can represent productivity
at = a0f(Et) where f() is a concave function with similar properties as the function
h() and Et =
Pt
j=1 ej
(t j) as the stock of EGS expenditure. The parameter 
can therefore also be interpreted as the present useful component of the past EGS
expenditures. The value of  = 1 minimizes the sum of squared residuals of our
preferred empirical specication (see Appendix A3 for details). Equilibrium in the
labor market implies that the pre-EGS private labor at the start of period t is: l0t =
at=b; while the pre-EGS private wage is w0t = at where the productivity at the start
of the period t is a function of the stock of EGS capital which exists at the beginning
of period t.
EGS
Let lpt be the private employment in the presence of EGS. Let EGS wage be w
g
t
and  gt as the wage and access cost of EGS. Like in the BCK model, we introduce the
access cost  gt dened as the relative ease with which workers can access EGS work
compared to the private work. That is, the cost of accessing EGS work bgt = b=(1+
 gt ). The concept of introducing the relative cost of EGS work as a multiplicative
component to the worker specic cost enables EGS to selectively target workers with
relatively high individual cost.17 Then with  gt  0 and wgt  w0t = at; supply of labor
to the private sector is met with the following condition:18
  (at   w
g
t )(1 + 
g
t )
b gt
= lpt
While the condition of being unemployed even after an EGS is given by:
  w
g
t (1 + 
g
t )
b
= ltotalt
16For public works under both SGRY and NREGA, the labor to capital expenditure ratio is usually
maintained at a xed proportion of 60:40 (see Table 1). Given that expenditure on capital and labor
increases in roughly xed proportions of total expenditure, constant returns to scale is a reasonable
assumption.
17Otherwise EGS will either not hire any workers or will completely displace the private workforce.
See BCK for details.
18As explained in BCK, we do not consider the case of gt < 0; since this corresponds to EGS wage
wgt > at which goes against the stated objective of EGS providing wages at the minimum wage rate
to avoid competition with the private sector.
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lgt = l
total
t   lpt if and only if ltotalt  lpt [i:e: if at  wgt (1 +  gt )]. Depending upon the
value of EGS wage and access (wgt ; 
g
t ), we have 3 cases at hand:
Firstly, if EGS wage and access are jointly so low that: wgt (1 + 
g
t ) < at; then the
introduction of EGS has no impact on private employment. The labor supply facing
the private employers is the same as without EGS. Private employment and wages
in equilibrium are at the pre-EGS level while no labor is hired in the EGS. At the
other extreme, if at < w
g
t , then EGS completely crowds out private labor (assuming
 gt  0). The only other non-trivial option where EGS hires a positive number of
workers without completely displacing private labor is:
Proposition If wgt  at  wgt (1 +  gt ), the supply of labor to the private sector
contracts compared with the pre-EGS case. Hence the equilibrium labor in private
sector is less than the pre-EGS level. That is 0  lpt = (at w
g
t )(1+
g
t )
bgt
 l0t . EGS
employment lgt =
wgt (1+
g
t )
b
 lpt . Private wage stays at w0t = at. Hiring positive workers
in EGS results in creation of productive assets which increases worker productivity and
consequently private wages in the next period to at+1 = a0f(Gt+1) > a0f(Gt) = at.19
Hence as the proposition above shows, private wages can increase even in the
absence of spot market e¤ects as long as the EGS employs a positive amount of labor
which results in the build up of public capital generated under such employment
schemes.
Furthermore, as is shown in the BCK model, wages can increase contemporane-
ously due to e¢ ciency gains by correcting the distortions in the labor market that
arise due to oligopsonistic market power of employers. In fact, even the asset accumu-
lation channel can be motivated to raise EGS wages contemporaneously by assuming
a two season model as discussed in Basu (2013).20 Given the annual frequency of our
data in the empirical analysis, we include contemporaneous expenditure in the calcu-
lation of the stock of EGS expenditure to account for such possible upward pressures
on wages emanating from other channels.
19In comparison to our proposition, BCK discuss cases in which post-EGS private employment
may be higher than the pre-EGS level. This result emanates from the assumed market power of
the employers. Since private wages increase in all their cases and since the focus of our analysis
is the impact on wages, we circumvent a lengthy discussion on private employment by assuming
competitive labor market.
20Basu (2013) discusses hiring of labor in EGS and generation of public capital in the lean (or
dry) season with the productive gains being realized in the peak (rainy) season.
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4 Data
Data on program expenditure over the two employment schemes is collected from
Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD), Government of India. Although information
on NREGA is publicly available (www.nrega.nic.in), data on the now defunct SGRY
was collected from MoRD and Datanet (India) on request.21 Data on agricultural
wage rates is from Agricultural Wages of India (AWI) series. We deate both the
wage and employment expenditure data to 2001 prices using Consumer Price Index
for Rural Laborers (CPI-RL) collected by the Labor Bureau, Government of India.
Unless otherwise mentioned, all the variables in the empirical analysis are in real,
per-capita terms.
Employment expenditure data The Ministry of Rural Development reports
district-wise annual physical and nancial statements for both the programs. Physical
statements include details like the number of public works planned, initiated, and
completed while the nancial statements give statistics on the opening balance, total
availability of funds, and total expenditure. We use total expendituregures to
construct the stock of EGS expenditure.
Data on SGRY is from the year of its implementation in 2001 to its last operational
nancial year 2007-08. Data on NREGA is from the nancial year 2006-07 to 2010-11.
Hence we have ten years (2001-2010) of data on employment expenditure (and other
related variables) for all the districts of the country. At any point in time, only one of
the two schemes were active in a district.22 To the best of our knowledge, we are the
rst to consider such disaggregated employment expenditure data which spans two
major employment programs over the period of ten years to understand the impact
of EGS on wages in India.
Agricultural wage dataWe use wage rate data of rural labor as reported by the
Agricultural Wages of India (AWI). The AWI data series was initiated by Ministry
of Agriculture in 1951. The uniqueness of the AWI data series is the availability
of monthly wage rate data at district level. This provides us with a much more
continuous data in comparison with the National Sample Survey data sets which are
21To check the reliability of the SGRY data, the district-wise estimates were aggregated to state-
level and were compared with the corresponding state-level estimates which are published in the
MoRD annual reports. Apart from minor di¤erences, the match was near perfect.
22As noted earlier, the two programs did not coexist together in a district even during the phase-
wise implementation of NREGA.
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conducted quinquennially.23 The AWI data is the most reliable source of agricultural
wages in India and has been extensively used for time series analysis pertaining to
agricultural wages in India.24 We take the average of male and female wages to
construct our measure of agricultural wages. Since the employment expenditure data
is of annual frequency, we convert the monthly wage data to annual frequency by
taking 12 month averages. Appendix A4 discusses construction of wage and other
variables in detail. Since the wage data is not available for all the districts in the
country, our nal district level panel data is for 10 years from 2001-2010 and covers
151 districts over 13 major states of India.
5 Empirical model and results
Regression framework
We empirically estimate the non-linear relationship between wages and the stock
of EGS expenditure (as motivated in section 3) as a log-log model. We therefore
estimate various specications of:
log(wi;t) = i + t + it+  log(Ei;t) + INREGA + Xi;t + i;t (1)
where the subscripts i and t denote district and year respectively. wi;t is the eld
wage, and Ei;t is the stock of EGS expenditure as dened in section 3 (with  = 1).25
INREGA is an indicator variable which takes the value one for a district from the year
NREGA was introduced and zero before that. The coe¢ cient of INREGA :  estimates
the e¤ect of NREGA or the intensication e¤ect. District and year xed e¤ects are
controlled by i and t respectively while it control for district specic (di¤erential)
trends. Finally, Xi;t is a vector of other controls discussed below.
A serious threat to our empirical strategy is the problem of endogeneity. Below, we
illustrate how our empirical specication corrects for the endogeneity bias. We further
check for potentially endogenous district-year uctuations in program expenditure in
section 5.1.
23Recently, thin rounds (with lesser number of observations) have been conducted at a higher
frequency. However there are issues like the reliability and representativeness of thin round estimates.
24See for e.g., Ravallion et al. (1993), Özler et al. (1996), Himanshu (2005), and Berg et al.
(2015).
25In Appendix A3 we show that the results are largely robust to non-zero rates of depreciation.
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If district specic indices (xed e¤ects) like demographics, proneness to drought,
and relative poverty ratios are inuential in determining the level of expenditure,
then omitting such unobserved and time-invariant district e¤ects may result in an
omitted variable bias.26 To highlight this point, we rst estimate Equation (1) with
log(Ei;t) and INREGA as the only regressors. To account for the problem of serial
correlation, we report standard errors clustered at the district level in all the regres-
sions. Furthermore, given the heterogeneity in the size of the districts in our panel, all
the regressions are weighted by district population.27 As the rst column of Table 3
shows, the coe¢ cient of log(Ei;t) is estimated to be  0:7 which is highly signicantly
di¤erent from zero (t > 3:5) while the additional impact of NREGA is estimated to
signicantly increase wages by 20%. Intuitively, if the level of EGS expenditure is
positively related to the backwardness of a district, then the estimated coe¢ cient b
should be expected to be su¤ering from a large negative bias towards zero.
To account for xed e¤ects in our model, we add district xed e¤ects i and the
indicator variable INREGA (to measure any additional e¤ect due to the NREGA) in
the second column of Table 3. As the estimates show, the elasticity of wage increases
to 0:06 which is highly signicant at 0:1% level. The coe¢ cient on INREGA reports
a signicant 3:8% additional increase in wages due to NREGA. This nding lends
support to our hypothesis that the estimate b in column 1 was su¤ering from a large
negative bias due to omitted xed e¤ects. Another important source of endogeneity
can be a change in the supply of EGS at the national level in a given year due to (say)
an aggregate negative shock to the agriculture sector. To account for such possibly
endogenous increases or decreases in the outlay of funds at the national level, we
further include year xed e¤ects (t) to our specication in column 3 of Table 3. Year
xed e¤ects also control for aggregate events like bad weather shocks (poor monsoon)
that may a¤ect the agriculture sector or eld wages at a national level. Including year
xed e¤ects further increase our estimate b to 0:085 which is signicantly di¤erent
from zero at 1% level. The coe¢ cient of INREGA ceases to be signicantly di¤erent
from zero after the inclusion of year xed e¤ects.28
26See Bahal (2015) for a discussion of how relative indices like state to national poverty ratio can
largely be categorized as a time invariant, state-specic feature.
27Apart from minor changes in the point estimates, the basic result of our analysis remains the
same if we do not weight our regressions.
28Dropping INREGA does not impact the estimate b in Table 3, we nevertheless continue to include
it in all our specications.
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Next we check for a possible bias due to the presence of district specic trends.
Controlling for di¤erential trends allow us to check for any potential bias that may
result if the growth in the stock of EGS expenditure reects the evolution of district
specic indicators that may in turn be correlated with the growth of eld wages.
Growth of indicators like the general development or the capability to implement
the scheme can be district specic and are hence important to control for. Includ-
ing heterogeneous trends however may also confound the analysis as the empirical
specication may not be able to distinguish the treatment e¤ect from di¤erential
trends.
Column 4 of Table 3 estimates b after adding district specic linear trends (it)
as additional controls. Encouragingly, the estimate of log(Ei;t) is highly stable at
0:08 and continues to be signicantly di¤erent from zero at 1% level. This suggests
that most of the endogeneity may be attributed to the between district variation in
log(Ei;t). Figure 4 motivates this point by plotting the district-wise growth of the
stock of EGS expenditure over time for four major states: Rajasthan, Orissa, Mad-
hya Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh. As Figure 4 shows, most of the within district
variation in log(Ei;t) correspond to the rst, second, and third phases of NREGA
implementation in each of the states during the years 2006, 2007, and 2008 respec-
tively (highlighted in grey). Such within variation is likely to be exogenous as these
were mostly due to a change in policy at the national level which was independent to
current or prospective uctuations in local wages. This may explain why inclusion of
district specic trends does not change b substantially.29
Finally, in column 5 of Table 3, we add additional regressors like an indicator
for state election-year and the proportion of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
population in a district. These variables are important to control for since politi-
cal motivations at the time of state elections and other district characteristics may
inuence the overall level of expenditure in a district. These variables are together
represented byXi;t in Equation (1). The estimate of log(Ei;t) is robust to the inclusion
of these additional controls and remains signicant at 1% level.
We treat this nal specication with all controls as our preferred specication.
Hence Table 3 provides evidence that after controlling for district and year xed
29Controlling for district-specic trends however is important in our case since without such con-
trols, the general growth in wages over time may be misrepresented as the e¤ect on wages due to
Ei;t (which includes a trend by construction).
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e¤ects, elasticity of wage is extremely stable and robust to the inclusion of district-
specic trends and other important controls. Based on the average annual growth of
the stock of EGS expenditure along with the estimated elasticity of wage implies an
average wage growth of 2:86%. Since annual growth of Ei;t follows a distribution with
some outliers, we also compute annual wage growth based on median growth of Ei;t
which estimates wage growth at 2:34%.30 The estimated growth in wages due to the
two workfare programs is large especially when compared with the average growth of
3% per annum for the districts in our sample.
5.1 Available funds as an instrument for actual expenditure
Although our preferred specication of Equation (1) deals with the problem of endo-
geneity emanating from both time invariant heterogeneous e¤ects and district-specic
trends, it is still susceptible to district-year specic shocks that may inuence eld
wages and EGS expenditure simultaneously. For example, a local negative weather
shock may adversely a¤ect the agriculture sector (and hence wages) while resulting in
higher than expected EGS expenditure due to a higher demand for public work. See
Drèze (1990) which discusses a high take up of public employment by laborers under
Maharashtras EGS during the famine of 1970-73. Such weather shocks, along with
any other events like local conicts may negatively impact wages and result in higher
than expected expenditure. If true, our estimated elasticity of wage is still likely
to su¤er from a negative omitted variable bias. We exploit the fund allocation and
expenditure process of the schemes to rst identify the expenditure variations that
can possibly be classied as endogenous. We then check for any potential bias due to
such uctuations using availability of funds at the district level as an instrument for
actual expenditure.
Fund allocation process
Under both the programs we study, districts receive funds from the central gov-
ernment at the start of the scal year. Given the nature of the accounting process
which rolls over to the next nancial year, there is a possibility that the total actual
expenditure (at district level) may exceed the funds made available at the start of
30The average and median growth rates of Ei;t are stable over the two program regimes. Hence
our implied wage growth estimates are not sensitive to any particular program regime. Below we
test whether constant elasticity over the two program regimes can be assumed.
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the scal year. Any previous obligations resulting from excess expenditure in the last
scal year are shown as negative opening balance in the following year which are met
by appropriate releases from the central government. Hence availability of funds =
releases + opening balance.
Utilization of available funds
We dene utilization ratio = 100ei;t=eai;j, where eai;j is the availability of funds for
district i in year t. Figure 5 highlights year-wise utilization of funds as a percentage
of funds made available for the 151 districts considered in our study. The observa-
tions marked in red show over-utilization while the observations in blue represent
under-utilization. A valid concern towards the estimates reported in our preferred
specication is that if over utilization of funds correspond to (say) weather or any
other local negative shock, then our OLS estimates may still be downward biased
since we do not control for such district-year events in Equation (1).31 Similarly, if
under-utilization of available funds reects actual demand for the program (which is
low under good market conditions), then again our estimates can be expected to be
downward biased.
Determinants of fund availability
Government records suggest that apart from district and year specic e¤ects
(which are already controlled for in our preferred specication), the utilization of
funds (at district level) during the previous year is an important indicator in deciding
the availability of funds in the current year.32 This change in the availability of funds
is after settling any previous obligations that are reected in the opening balance
(which are met by the appropriate releases). To further clarify this point, we show
in column 1 of Table 4 that a 1% increase in last years utilization ratio increases the
funds released by 0:92% in the current year. In column 2 of Table 4 we regress fund
availability on last years utilization ratio. As column 2 shows, a 1% increase in the
utilization ratio in the previous year results in a 0:42% increase in the availability
of funds in the current year. Given that part of the releases goes towards meeting
any previous obligations, the higher response of releases (in comparison with fund
availability) to past utilization ratio is expected. Comparing results from column 1
and 2 imply that the positive association between availability of funds and past uti-
31Nearly 9% of the total observations represent events where funds were over-utilized.
32See for example nrega.nic.in/presentations/implement_NREGA.ppt.
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lization is not an accounting relation and indeed reects pre-determined adjustments
intended to reduce the gap between fund availability and expenditure needs.
Given the exibility accorded in the system where actual expenditure can accom-
modate uctuations in the demand for EGS due to unexpected events like a weather
shock, we may use fund availability as an instrument for actual expenditure to bypass
such potentially endogenous and unexpected district-year expenditure uctuations as
shown in Figure 5. However, if fund availability moves with anticipated future shocks,
then this may threaten its validity as an instrument. To address this concern, we
choose the average rainfall a district receives (in millimeters) during the forthcoming
rainy season as our measure of shock and check its inuence on fund availability in
column 3 of Table 4.33 We discuss rainfall data in Appendix A4.
We choose rainfall as our measure of shock since: 1) uctuations in rainfall are
truly independent to wage and the level of EGS expenditure in a district; 2) local
weather shocks are the most relevant in causing disruptions to the agriculture sector
in India which may also prompt a higher injection of funds in EGS as part of aid
expenditure; and 3) weather events are systematically forecasted and this measure
may inform the availability of funds next year. The regression in column 3 however
shows that availability of funds is invariant to the amount of rainfall a district receives
in a particular year during the rainy season.34 The results in Table 4 hence suggest
that changes in fund availability are largely pre-determined and do not correspond
to anticipated future district-year shocks.35 The lack of any motivation to e¢ ciently
predict availability of funds, given the exibility to under or overspend (as shown
in Figure 5) supports our hypothesis that availability of funds is independent of
future district-year shocks. We therefore use availability of funds as an instrument
for actual expenditure to check for potentially endogenous district-year uctuations
in EGS expenditure.
OLS versus 2SLS
Keeping the same set of controls as in our preferred specication (Equation 1),
33We dene rainy season (also known as monsoon in India) as the months of June, July, and
August. Results are invariant to choosing other criteria of measuring rainfall.
34Although actual rainfall gures are not available at the start of the scal year, if the forecasted
value of such shocks are indeed inuential in determining fund availability, then so should be the
actual estimates.
35We rule out serial correlation between shocks by checking for correlation between events that
represent rainfall above or below one standard deviation from the mean.
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we use two alternative instruments for our suspected endogenous variable: log(Ei;t).
Firstly, we instrument log(Ei;t) with the stock of funds made availableEAi;t =
Pt
j=1 e
a
i;j
t j
where eai;j is as dened above. Equation (2) represents the rst stage regression equa-
tion corresponding to this instrument:
log(Ei;t) = i + t + it+  log(E
A
i;t) + INREGA + Xi;t + i;t (2)
Secondly, we use only the contemporaneous availability of funds eai;j to instrument
for log(Ei;t) with Equation (3) as the corresponding rst stage regression equation:
log(Ei;t) = i + t + it+  log(e
a
i;j) + INREGA + Xi;t + i;t (3)
For comparison with estimates obtained under the two-stage least squares (2SLS),
column 1 of Table 5 reports the results obtained under our preferred specication
(column 5 of Table 3). Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 respectively report the rst
and second stage results while using the stock of funds made available: log(EAi;t) as
an instrument for log(Ei;t). While columns 4 and 5 respectively show the rst and
second stage results when we use only the contemporaneous availability of funds: eai;j
as an instrument for log(Ei;t).
The dependent variable in OLS and both second stage estimations of 2SLS is
log(wi;t). As expected, there is a near one to one correspondence between the stocks
of EGS expenditure and funds made available (column 2). The rst stage regression
of log(Ei;t) on log(EAi;t) (with all controls) yields an estimate of 0:97 which is highly
signicant. The coe¢ cient of log(Ei;t) in second stage is estimated to be at 0:07 which
is very close to the OLS estimate of 0:08 as reported in column 1.
Given that the 2SLS and OLS estimates of log(Ei;t) are so close to each other, we
test whether the suspected endogenous regressor log(Ei;t) can indeed be treated as
exogenous. The Endog. Test (last row) which is based on the di¤erence of Sargan-
Hansen test statistics reports the p  value of 0:33. The estimated test statistic and
the corresponding p-value suggest that we cannot reject the null of exogeneity of
log(Ei;t).
Finally we do a robustness check on our 2SLS analysis by instrumenting log(Ei;t)
by log(eai;j). The rst stage regression results of Equation (3) are reported in column
4 of Table 5. The estimated rst stage results imply that a 1% increase in contem-
poraneous availability of funds increases the stock of EGS expenditure by roughly a
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quarter of a percent.36 The F statistics for both our instruments is well above 20 and
hence do not pose a threat of weak instruments problem.
The corresponding coe¢ cient of log(Ei;t) in the second stage (column 5) is esti-
mated to be 0:8 which is the same as the OLS estimate. Since the 2SLS estimate is
essentially same as the OLS estimate, the endogeneity test results in a highly insignif-
icant test statistics (p  value of 0:98) again suggesting that log(Ei;t) can be treated
as an exogenous regressor in our preferred specication.
Similar OLS and IV results gives us condence on the reliability of the estimates
obtained in our preferred specication of Equation (1). The results also suggest that
seemingly endogenous district-year shocks as shown in Figure 5 may most likely be
caused due idiosyncratic uctuations in the supply side (like political or administrative
will) that are largely uncorrelated to uctuations in local wage rates. Supporting
a similar point, Imbert and Papp (2015) conclude that the substantial inter-state
heterogeneity in the provision of public employment under NREGA may be due to
supply factors like administrative capacity or political will rather than demand factors
like labor market conditions or poverty.
Hence, the stock e¤ect seems to capture an annual wage increase of 2:3-2:9% due
to employment schemes. On the contrary and in agreement with Berg et al. (2015),
we nd no immediate jump in wages due to the implementation of NREGA which
signies weak spot e¤ects. We replicate Berg et al. (2015) results in Appendix A2.
Below we discuss further extensions on the stock e¤ect under our preferred baseline
specication of Equation (1).
5.2 Robustness
Monte Carlo Placebo Simulations
While using a panel of district-year observations, it is important to check for
the power of standard statistical tests. We conduct a series of Monte Carlo placebo
simulations where we randomly assign the time-series of the stock of EGS expenditure:
{log(Ei;2001); log(Ei;2002);    ; log(Ei;2010)} among districts37. The rationale behind
36However unlike Equation (2), the rst stage relation between log(Ei;t) and log(eai;t) in Equation
(3) does not represent any structural relationship between the two variables and is data driven.
37Randomizing observations across districts and years will destroy the interpretation of the variable
as a stock measure and result in a zero estimate by construction. In that respect, our simulations
are more conservative as we shu­ e the entire time series.
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such an experiment is that if the stock of EGS expenditure has no inuence on
eld wages, then the placebo coe¢ cients obtained from shu­ ing the regressor and
matching up with di¤erent values of the dependent variable should not be too di¤erent
from the true (non-randomized) coe¢ cient.38
Figure 6 plots the cumulative distribution function of the placebo estimates along
with the true (non-randomized) coe¢ cient as estimated in column 5, Table 3. In each
simulation, a coe¢ cient is estimated for the regression of eld wages on the shu­ ed
stock of EGS expenditure variable under our preferred specication of Equation (1).
As can be seen, the placebo estimates never exceed the true coe¢ cient. Hence the
e¤ect of EGS on wages is estimated to be the largest only when we align a district to
its true stock of EGS expenditure series. The simulations also validate the specicity
of the tests as only 1.2% of the placebo coe¢ cients were found to be statistically
signicant and greater than zero.39
E¤ect over di¤erent program regimes
Until now we have assumed that the response of wages to EGS expenditure is
similar over both the program regimes. Although Equation (1) allows for growth of
wages to be di¤erent on average under NREGA by controlling for INREGA, it assumes
constant elasticity of wage under the two programs. Hence to check whether wages
have become more or less responsive under NREGA, we estimate separate elasticities
for SGRY (INREGA = 0) and NREGA (INREGA = 1) regimes. If projects under
NREGA were comparatively more productive than those undertaken in SGRY, then
this may imply a higher productivity (and hence wage) increase than usual. Table
6 compares the elasticity of wage as estimated under our preferred specication in
column 1 to the case where separate elasticities are estimated for di¤erent programs
by interacting INREGA with log(Ei;t).
The coe¢ cient of INREGA continues to be insignicantly di¤erent from zero. The
elasticity of wage under SGRY regime is estimated to be slightly higher at 0:11 and
is highly signicant (t > 3) while the corresponding elasticity of wage under NREGA
continues to be very similar to our baseline elasticity of 0:08 which also is highly
signicant (t > 3). However, we cannot reject the equality of the two coe¢ cients
even at 10% signicance level. Hence, our results suggest that the elasticities of wage
38See for example Kennedy (2003) and Shoag (2010) for a discussion on the sampling distribution
of the test statistics employing randomized simulations.
39This is consistent with the desired specicity of the tests.
23
are very comparable under the two program regimes.
Other robustness checks
We test whether there is any sub sample heterogeneity based on the characteris-
tics that dene how well or how intensely the employment guarantee schemes were
implemented. A useful criterion to measure the degree of implementation of such
schemes is the rationing rate of public employment. Dutta et al. (2012) dene rate of
rationing as the proportion of laborers who wanted but did not get work in EGS. To
check whether the relationship between log(wi;t) and log(Ei;t) is structurally di¤erent
for states based on the extent of rationing they did, we split the overall sample of
13 states into 6 less rationing states (rationing < 40%) and 7 high rationing states
(rationing > 40%).
The criterion of selecting the benchmark value of 40% is simply to divide the
aggregate sample into two (near) equal halves. Column 1 of Table 7 reports the
results of estimating separate elasticities by interacting an indicator variable Ration
which takes the value one if state-wise rationing is less than 40% and zero otherwise.40
The elasticities for the high and low rationing groups are estimated to be around 0:09
and 0:08 respectively. Both the estimates are very close to the aggregate sample
elasticity as reported in column 5, Table 3. Given the loss of observations, there is
a substantial increase in the standard errors for both the estimates. Both estimates
however are still signicant at the standard (5%) condence level. As expected, we
cannot reject the null of equality of the two coe¢ cients (p   value = 0:76). This is
evidence to support that the underlying relationship between wages and expenditure
is stable across states and is largely independent of the extent of rationing.
Another important variable that may help ascertain the extent or intensity of
program implementation is the annual average per-capita expenditure incurred over
a district. Column 2 of Table 7 reports separate elasticities for sub-samples divided
on the basis of district-wise low and high annual average expenditure respectively.
Like in the case of rationing, this is achieved by interacting an indicator variable
Avg Expwhich takes the value one (zero) if the average expenditure of a district is
above (below) the median value of the series (
P2010
t=2001 ei;t)=10. The results are very
similar to the rationing case of column 1. The elasticities for the low and high average
40The indicator variable Rationtakes value one for less rationing states: Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu,
Himachal Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, and Madhya Pradesh and zero for the rest of the
seven states in our sample.
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expenditure groups are estimated to be around 0.09 and 0.07 respectively which are
signicant at 5% condence levels. Again, the equality of the two coe¢ cients cannot
be rejected (p-value = 0:70).
The results hence support our preferred specication which assumes a constant
elasticity of wage over the entire sample. It is worth mentioning that constant elastic-
ity of wage doesnt necessarily imply absence of any scale e¤ects because of rationing,
average expenditure, or how well the program is implemented.41 Any such di¤erences
in the intercept or growth rate of wages at the district level are controlled (eliminated)
by the xed e¤ects (both xed and time varying) in our model. In that spirit, our
results can best be understood as providing a lower bound estimate of the impact that
such schemes have had on wages since 2001. Appendix A5 discusses other results like
the program impact on male and female eld wages separately.
6 Conclusion
Large public workfare programs that are involved in the creation of public infrastruc-
ture along with the provision of public employment can increase private wages apart
from the spot market e¤ects like e¢ ciency gains and labor demand e¤ects. In this
paper, we motivate growth in wages due to the increase in productivity as a result
of the build up of productive public capital. This channel motivates the stock of
EGS expenditure as the relevant measure to capture the impact of EGS on private
wages. Our empirical specication of using stock of EGS expenditure is however not
hinged solely on the accrual of public capital. Improved capability to implement such
schemes more e¢ ciently due to the accumulation of administrative capital can also
contribute to explain the stock e¤ect of such programs. As a falsication exercise, we
show that if the underlying mechanism of wage increase is solely due to a spot mar-
ket e¤ect like gains in e¢ ciency, then the stock of EGS expenditure is not a relevant
measure in capturing wage increases.
Another contribution of this study is to employ a novel data-set of district-wise
annual employment expenditure over the period 2001-10 to construct the stock of EGS
expenditure to estimate the impact of EGS on wages. Our baseline identication is
achieved after controlling for district and year xed e¤ects, di¤erential trends, and
41Imbert and Papp (2015) for example report higher impact on wages for star states that imple-
mented NREGA well.
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other controls. In line with our expectations, this exercise shows the correction of
a large negative bias in the estimate of the elasticity of wage. Finally, we exploit
the fund allocation process and use the availability of funds as an instrument for
actual expenditure to check for potentially endogenous district-year uctuations that
may further bias the results. The results from this exercise support our baseline
identication. We nd agricultural wages to have grown by 2.3-2.9% per annum due
to such large workfare programs.
The importance of the stock e¤ect highlighted in the paper has broad implica-
tions for impact evaluation of similar policies. The key insight of the study is that
the impact of a policy change may not solely depend on individual doses of policy
treatment. Rather, the variable of interest may be sensitive to a measure that cap-
tures the aggregate exposure to the new policy. The stock or aggregate exposure
e¤ect has been extensively discussed in the medical literature and is a promising area
of future research in impact evaluation of economic policies.
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Appendix
A1. Simulating the spot market e¤ect of EGS on wages
We construct an articial panel data-set of 100 districts and 10 years using a model
of EGS as discussed in BCK. We show that if the underlying data generating process
is a model where private sector wages change only because of the movements in the
spot market for labor, then the stock of EGS expenditure has no power in explain-
ing variations in wages. In this case, the contemporaneous EGS expenditure is the
relevant variable to capture the impact of EGS on wages. Using the BCK model, we
consider the non-trivial case where the EGS hires a positive amount of labor. The
increase in private wages is due to e¢ ciency gains from the introduction of an EGS
which alleviates the distortions created by oligopsonistic market power of employers.
We regard the increase in wages due to e¢ ciency gains as a spot market e¤ect.
In constructing the data, we use the following assumptions. i) Public wage wgi;t
is assumed to be equal to a constant  plus a random error "i;t  N(0; 2). ii)
The marginal (and average) value product of labor ai is assumed to vary uniformly
across the hundred districts between [a1 a2]. iii) Employers are assumed to have
monopsonistic or oligopsonistic market power.42 iv) Each district is assumed to have
a unit mass of working population. Since only wgi;t (and not l
g) enters the expression
of private wage wi;t in BCK, we keep EGS employment to be xed at lg for all
observations.43
Given assumptions i)-iv), we ensure EGS to hire a xed number of workers lg
by varying the access to EGS  gi;t (which is controlled by the government).
44 In
other words, this assumes that the government aims to create a xed number of EGS
employment in every district and the variation in EGS expenditure emanates solely
from exogenous uctuations in government wage in a district "i;t. Figure A1.1 plots
the log of private wage (y-axis) before and after the EGS for the hundred districts
(x-axis) in ascending order of labor productivity. The gure highlights the increase in
private wages (in red) due to the gains in e¢ ciency in the case of N = 10 employers.
42We conduct 10 di¤erent simulations by varying the number of employers in each simulation from
1 (monopoly) to 10 (oligopoly).
43A regression of wi;t on EGS expenditure ei;t = w
g
i;tl
g is meaningful only as long as variations in
EGS expenditure emanate from uctuations in public wage.
44Like in BCK, we ensure that the access to EGS is always less costly than access to private
employment. That is gi;t > 0:
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Using the data as generated under the assumptions discussed above, we estimate
Equations (A1.1) and (A1.2) to obtain the elasticities of wage with respect to the
ow (f ) and stock (s) of EGS expenditure respectively.
45
log(wi;t) = i + f log(ei;t) + i;t (A1.1)
log(wi;t) = i + s log(Ei;t) + i;t (A1.2)
Figure A1.2 compares elasticities of wage under the two specications while vary-
ing the number of employers (x-axis).46 In the case the employer has monopsonistic
market power (N = 1), Figure A1.2 shows that the elasticity of wage using contempo-
raneous expenditure f is estimated to be 0:43 which is highly signicantly di¤erent
from zero (p < 0:001). On the contrary, using the stock of EGS expenditure as in
Equation (A1.2), s is estimated to be equal to zero (up to 3 decimal places). The
e¢ cacy of EGS to increase private wages diminishes as the economy tends to a more
competitive labor market (as N increases). This is expected as the gains in e¢ ciency
work by reducing the distortion created by the market power of the employers. In the
limiting case of perfect competition, there is no distortion to correct as wages tend to
be equal to the marginal product of labor ai. This is reected in Figure A1.2 where
f decreases as the number of employers increase. On the other hand, the elasticity
of wage s as obtained under Equation (A1.2) is always estimated to be equal to zero,
irrespective of the assumed number of employers.
This exercise hence motivates that if EGS impacts private wages only by a¤ecting
the spot market for labor, then the stock of EGS expenditure is not relevant in
explaining private wages. On the contrary, in our empirical analysis above, we nd a
signicant and positive impact of the stock of EGS expenditure on wages in contrast
to a zero contemporaneous impact (as shown in Appendix A2). This shows that the
increase in wages cannot solely be attributed to changes in the spot market for labor.
45The interpretation of all the variables in Equations (A1.1) and (A1.2) is the same as in the main
text. We only need district xed e¤ects in the regression since we assume labor productivity (ai)
to be time invariant and district specic. Since the data generated has no trend or year e¤ect by
construction, we do not control for such e¤ects.
46For comparison, we keep the series of public wage (wgi;t), labor productivity (ai), and public
employment generated under the EGS (lg) to be the same under the N simulations. Only the
number of employers and correspondingly, the access to EGS work (gi;t) is allowed to vary.
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Figure A1.1: Wage increase due to e¢ ciency gains
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Note: The gure shows increase in private wages due to e¢ ciency gains under employers having
oligopsonistic market power. Districts are ordered in ascending order of worker productivity.
Figure A1.2: Comparing Stock and Flow Specications
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Note: The gure compares ^f with ^s as estimated under Equations (A1.1) and (A1.2). The
gure plots coe¢ cients for 10 di¤erent sets of simulations by varying the number of employers (from
monopoly to oligopoly).
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A2. Berg et al (2015)
Here we replicate the ndings of Berg et al. (2015) where the standard regression
di¤erence-in-di¤erence (DD) framework is unable to capture any immediate increase
in wages due to an EGS.We estimate Equation (A2) where the variables have the same
interpretation as in Equation (1). Berg et al. (2015) estimate a very similar regression
di¤erence-in-di¤erence model albeit with a monthly frequency AWI data. INREGA is
the NREGA implementation indicator as dened in section 5. The coe¢ cient of
INREGA :  estimates the impact of NREGA on wages. This specication however
ignores the continued existence of SGRY in the control districts.
log(wi;t) = i + t + INREGA + i;t (A2)
Column 1 of Table A2 shows the estimated coe¢ cient b with just an intercept as an
additional control. The estimated coe¢ cient indicates that the early-phase NREGA
districts had approximately 8% higher wages than late-phase NREGA districts. This
is remarkably similar to the ( 7:3%) estimate of Berg et al. (2015) for a similar
specication. However, the estimated impact of the regression DD does not continue
to hold once we account for district and year xed e¤ects in column 2. Controlling
for district and year xed e¤ects, b drops to  0:02 being insignicantly di¤erent
from zero. This again matches well with Berg et al. (2015) results of zero impact
after controlling for district and year xed e¤ects. As is discussed in their study, this
highlights the absence of a strong contemporaneous impact of EGS on wages.
Table A2: Impact on Wages using Simple Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence
log(wi;t) log(wi;t)
INREGA 0.080 -0.021
[0.021] [0.019]
District E¤ect No Yes
Year E¤ects No Yes
Observations 1493 1493
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.847
All regressions are weighted by district-level population.
The standard errors reported in square brackets are clus-
tered at district level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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A3. Estimating 
We are agnostic about the rate of accumulation and estimate  from the data. We
rst x the value of , estimate all the parameters in Equation (1) and compute the
corresponding sum of squared errors. We then repeat the same experiment for a large
number of values of  between [0 1]. Finally, we choose the value of  that corresponds
to the minimum of sum of squared errors so obtained. Persson and Tabellini (2009)
use a similar procedure to identify the structural parameters in their model in order to
construct the stock of democratic capital.47 Similar to them, we nd a corner solution
of  = 1 that best ts the data.
However, considering zero depreciation implies that all past treatments are weighted
equally and independently to each other, which may be a strong assumption. To check
for the robustness of our results, we relax this assumption. Below we compare our
results (under our preferred specication) obtained by assuming zero depreciation
( = 1) to cases where we impose ad-hoc depreciation rates of 2:5% ( = 0:975) and
5% ( = 0:95). Our results are largely robust to these assumed rates of depreciation.
However, it is worth noting that as depreciation rate increases from zero to complete
depreciation, Ei;t tends to ei;j which only allows for spot market e¤ects (see Appendix
A1).
Table A3: Results with di¤erent discounting rates
 = 1  = 0:975  = 0:95
log(Ei;t) 0.081 0.077 0.073
[0.025] [0.024] [0.023]
All Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1493 1493 1493
Adjusted R2 0.912 0.912 0.912
The dependent variable is log(wi;t). All regressions are
weighted by district-level population. The standard er-
rors reported in square brackets are clustered at district
level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
47Identication of the structural parameters in their case is based on maximizing the envelope of
likelihood function (corresponding to logit estimation). See Persson and Tabellini (2009) for details.
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A4. Data
Agricultural wage data The data reports daily wage rates for four main categories
of rural labor: skilled labor, eld labor, other agricultural labor, and herdsman. Skilled
labor is further disaggregated into blacksmith, carpenter, and cobbler. Field labor
- the category central to our analysis - reports wage rates for ploughing, sowing,
reaping, and weeding.48 With the exception of skilled labor (which reports wages
only for men), wages are reported for men, women, and children for the rest of the
above mentioned operations. We exclude wages reported under children as most of
the observations are missing under this category. We take the average of male and
female wages to construct our measure of eld wages. Hence we have monthly wage
data for ten years from 2001-2010. The AWI series are reported in the agricultural
year format which starts from July to June of the next calendar year.
Matching wage and expenditure data: The monthly frequency AWI data
is not of a very good quality with missing data for some of months. Furthermore,
the annual publication of AWI data sporadically includes or excludes data at the
district and even state level.49 Data for nearly 40% of the districts is reported for
less than 6 out of 10 years. We rst improve the signal to noise ratio of wage data by
converting the monthly AWI data to annual frequency by taking 12 month averages
from April to March of the next calendar year to match the frequency and period
of the employment expenditure data which is reported in the Indian nancial year
format.50
To allow for comparison over the two program regimes and to ensure the reliability
of our results, we consider as balanced wage data as possible. We circumvent the
problem of missing data by restricting our analysis to only those districts for which
the wage data has been reported for at-least nine out of the maximum 10 years.51
There are 13 major states and 151 districts that satisfy this criterion.
One possible objection to the elimination of districts with incomplete data can be
the correlation of the backwardness of a district with unavailability of the wage data.
48Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra do not give operation-wise details for eld labor
and instead furnish data for the group (eld labor) as a whole.
49Data for new states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand is not available before 2005.
50The Indian nancial year starts from April to March of the following year.
51The results dont change at all if we restrict our analysis to a complete balanced panel but we
lose nearly 160 observations. Similarly, results largely remain the same if we tend towards a more
unbalanced panel.
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If this is true, then restricting the analysis to 151 districts will result in the proportion
of early phase NREGA districts to be substantially lower in this sub-sample compared
to the aggregate sample. This however is not the case. The proportion of phase I
and phase II districts at nearly 37% and 58% respectively in the aggregate sample is
closely matched by the sub-sample proportion of 42% and 64% for phase I and phase
II districts respectively.
Rainfall data We use remote sensed rainfall data from the Tropical Rainfall
Measuring Mission (TRMM) satellite.52 See Fetzer (2014) for a detailed discussion
on the consistency and the quality of TRMM data over any other remote sensed or
ground-based data.
A5. Other results
E¤ect on male and female wages
We check whether there are any di¤erential e¤ects of such programs on male and
female wages. The results below are discussed by replacing log(wi;t) in Equation (1)
by log(wmi;t) (male wages) and log(w
f
i;t) (female wages) respectively. Table A5.1 reports
wage elasticities based on gender as well as over di¤erent program regimes. Column
1 of Table A5.1 reports elasticity of male wages over the aggregate sample while
column 2 shows male wage elasticities separately over SGRY and NREGA regimes.
Similarly, columns 3 and 4 of Table A5.1 report elasticities of female wages over the
aggregate sample and over separate regimes respectively. The elasticity of male wages
is estimated close to the average wage elasticity at 0:07 which is signicantly di¤erent
from zero at 1% level.
In comparison, the elasticity of female wages is nearly 57% higher at 0:11 which
is also highly signicantly di¤erent from zero (t > 3). The higher response of female
wage rates to EGS is expected since on average, female wage rates are already 18-
20% lower than its male counterpart due to general gender biases and other social
restrictions. Higher growth in female wage rates is expected given that the wages
o¤ered under EGS are equal for men and women. Based on average growth rates of
the stock of EGS expenditure, annual male wage growth rate is estimated at 2:37%
while female wages are estimated to grow at nearly 3:71% per annum. A test on the
equality of coe¢ cients over the two program regimes cannot be rejected even at 10%
52Thanks to Thiemo Fetzer for sharing the rainfall data.
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level for both male and female wages. Our result of higher impact of EGS on female
wage rates is in accordance with similar ndings by Azam (2012).
E¤ect on skilled wages
The skilled wage category include wages for carpenter, cobbler, and blacksmith.
Given that EGS aims to provide only unskilled manual labor work, one should not
theoretically expect any e¤ect on such semi-skilled wages that are higher in the wage
distribution when compared to eld wages. Column 1 of Table A5.2 reports a re-
gression of log of skilled wages log(wsi;t) on log(Ei;t) keeping the same controls as in
Equation (1). Surprisingly, the estimated elasticity of skilled wage is positive and
statistically signicant over the aggregate sample and over the SGRY regime. What
explains these counter-intuitive results?
One explanation can be that the initial rise in unskilled wages due to SGRY
exerted an upward pressure on semi-skilled wages as well. Such positive spill-over
e¤ects are plausible since all such activities together represent the rural labor market
as described by the Agricultural Wages of India. However, since the productivity
gains due to such EGS (as discussed in section 3) are mostly limited to unskilled
work, one should not expect a sustained increase in semi-skilled wages. This indeed
is reected by the insignicant elasticity of skilled wages estimated under the NREGA
regime in column 2 of Table A5.2. We reject the test of equality of coe¢ cients over the
two program regimes at 5% level. Our result of insignicant impact on skilled wages
under the NREGA regime is supported by similar ndings of Berg et al. (2015).
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Table A5.1: E¤ect on Field Wages for Men and Women
Dependent variable: log(wmi;t) log(w
f
i;t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Ei;t) 0.067 0.105
[0.026] [0.030]
SGRY 0.101 0.131
[0.033] [0.037]
NREGA 0.063 0.102
[0.026] [0.031]
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1499 1499 1495 1495
Adjusted R2 0.915 0.915 0.884 0.884
wmi;t: male wages. w
f
i;t: female wages. All regressions are weighted by
district-level population. The standard errors reported in square brackets
are clustered at district level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. p <
0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
Table A5.2: E¤ect on Semi-skilled Wages (Men)
Dependent variable: log(Skilled wage)
(1) (2)
log(Ei;t) 0.062
[0.027]
SGRY 0.103
[0.034]
NREGA 0.051
[0.027]
All Controls Yes Yes
Observations 1689 1689
Adjusted R2 0.917 0.917
All regressions are weighted by district-level population.
The standard errors reported in square brackets are clus-
tered at district level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: National Employment Expenditure
Figure 2: National Employment Generated
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Figure 3: Expenditure under NREGA and SGRY during 2006 and 2007
(a): Expenditure under NREGA in 2006. (b): Expenditure under NREGA and SGRY in 2006.
(c): Expenditure under NREGA in 2007. (d): Expenditure under NREGA and SGRY in 2007.
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Figure 4: Annual Growth Rate of the Stock of EGS Expenditure
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Note: The gure plots district-wise growth of the stock of EGS expenditure for four major states.
The large spikes in growth correspond to phase I, II, and III of NREGA implementation during
2006-2008 (highlighted in grey).
Figure 5: Actual Expenditure as a Percent of Fund Availability
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Note: The gure shows year-wise utilization of funds as a percent of funds made available. The
observations marked in red show over-utilization while the observations in blue represent under-
utilization.
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Figure 6: Placebo Tests using Randomization
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Note: The gure displays the CDF from one-thousand Monte Carlo simulations. The entire time-
series of the stock of EGS expenditure is randomly reassigned across districts with the time-series
structure preserved. In each simulation, a coe¢ cient is estimated for the regression of eld wages
on the shu­ ed stock of EGS expenditure variable, keeping all other controls of Equation (1). All
regressions are weighted by district population. The red vertical line shows the coe¢ cient estimated
without randomization. None of the randomized regressions produce a point estimate equal to or
larger than the non-randomized estimate.
Table 1: Comparison of SGRY and NREGA
Description SGRY NREGA
Centrally Sponsored Scheme Yes Yes
Districts covered All All
Objectives:
a) Wage Employment Yes Yes
b) Infrastructure Creation Yes Yes
c) Food Security Yes No
Centre:State Cost Ratio 75:25 90:10
Female participation target 33% 33%
Restrictions on public works:
a) Ban on contractors Yes Yes
b) Ban on heavy machinery Yes Yes
c) Wage:Capital Cost Ratio 60:40 60:40
Implementing authority Panchayati Institutions Panchayati Institutions
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Table 2: Productive Public Works under SGRY and NREGA
Number of Works in SGRY Number of Works in NREGA
(in thousands) (in thousands)
States Initiated Completed % Completed Initiated Completed % Completed
AP 87.22 70.68 81.04 738.09 375.77 50.91
AS 86.13 64.01 74.32 20.08 8.99 44.77
BR 91.24 56 61.37 124.48 57.56 46.24
GJ 52.57 44.96 85.52 91.73 71.82 78.29
HP 17.98 13.37 74.32 37.48 20.16 53.8
HR 28.09 27.11 96.49 6.28 3.57 56.78
KA 130.57 93.21 71.39 220.72 56.84 25.75
KL 26.18 12.11 46.24 73.2 48.42 66.15
MH 112.31 73.99 65.88 25.28 10.24 40.51
MP 138.5 118.16 85.31 457.59 194.63 42.53
OR 70.84 60.47 85.36 137.07 26.69 19.48
PB 21.81 18.39 84.35 7.12 3.16 44.31
RJ 52.32 44.02 84.14 144.77 54.37 37.56
TN 97.51 88.4 90.66 37.52 15.1 40.25
UP 266.26 212.85 79.94 368.5 231.12 62.72
WB 139.43 97.23 69.74 140.20 81.04 57.8
India 1600.65 1235.67 77.2 3028.43 1458.13 48.15
The table reports the average number of works taken up and completed under SGRY and NREGA
for each of the 16 major states of India. All India data includes data on all 27 states (excluding Goa).
Works include public projects undertaken under the employment guarantee schemes. These include
projects on 1) Rural Connectivity, 2) Flood Control and Protection, 3) Water Conservation and Water
Harvesting, 4) Drought Proong, 5) Micro Irrigation Works, and 6) Land Development among others.
Under NREGA, district-wise data is provided for works on each of these sub-categories. For SGRY,
only state-wise data on aggregate works is available.
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Table 3: Impact on Wages using Stock of EGS Expenditure
Dependent variable: log(wi;t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Ei;t) -0.070 0.061 0.085 0.079 0.081
[0.019] [0.010] [0.030] [0.025] [0.025]
INREGA 0.200 0.038 -0.035 -0.037 -0.038
[0.028] [0.016] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020]
District E¤ect No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year E¤ects No No Yes Yes Yes
Trend E¤ects No No No Yes Yes
Other Controls No No No No Yes
Observations 1493 1493 1493 1493 1493
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.829 0.851 0.912 0.912
Data is annual from 2001 to 2010 at district level. The dependent variable in all
the regressions is the log of real eld wages (in 2001 prices). Ei;t is the stock of
EGS expenditure. For a district, INREGA takes the value zero (one) before (after)
the implementation of NREGA. Column (1) reports regression with log(Ei;t) and
intercept only. Column (2) adds INREGA and districts xed e¤ects. Columns (3),
(4), and (5) progressively add year e¤ects, time trends, and other controls. Other
controls include state elections-year indicator and density of scheduled caste and
scheduled tribe population in a district. All regressions are weighted by district-
level population. The standard errors reported in square brackets are clustered
at district level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 4: Determinants of Fund Availability
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: log(Releasesi;t) log(Availabilityi;t) log(Availabilityi;t)
Utilization Ratioi;t 1 0.924 0.417 0.415
[0.175] [0.086] [0.086]
log(Raini;t) 0.068
[0.064]
District E¤ect Yes Yes Yes
Year E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Trend E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1052 1359 1359
Adjusted R2 0.768 0.850 0.850
The dependent variable in column 1 is the log of funds released at the start of the scal year.
The dependent variable in columns 2 and 3 is the log of the funds made available at the start of
the scal year. Raini;t refers to the average rainfall (in millimeters) during the rainy season. All
regressions are weighted by district-level population. The standard errors reported in square
brackets are clustered at district level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 5: Comparing OLS and 2SLS
OLS 2SLS 2SLS
First Second First Second
Stage Stage Stage Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Ei;t) 0.081 0.067 0.082
[0.025] [0.025] [0.035]
log(Eai;t) 0.971

[0.026]
log(eai;t) 0.269

[0.019]
District E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1493 1510 1493 1510 1493
F-stat Instrument> 20 Yes Yes
Endog. Test (p-value) 0.329 0.975
The dependent variable in columns (1), (3), and (5) is log(wi;t). The dependent variable in columns
(2) and (4) is log(Ei;t). The rst set of 2SLS results use the stock of funds available: log(Eai;t) as
instrument, while the second set of 2SLS results use contemporaneous availability of funds: eai;t as the
instrument. The endogeneity test is based on the di¤erence of two Sargan-Hansen statistics with the
null hypothesis that the suspected endogenous regressor can actually be treated as exogenous. All
regressions are weighted by district-level population. The standard errors reported in square brackets
are clustered at district level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 6: E¤ect over di¤erent program regimes
Dependent variable: log(wi;t)
(1) (2)
log(Ei;t) 0.081
[0.025]
INREGA -0.038 -0.035
[0.020] [0.021]
SGRY 0.111
[0.032]
NREGA 0.077
[0.026]
All Controls Yes Yes
Observations 1493 1493
Adjusted R2 0.912 0.912
The table compares the elasticity of wage obtained from
the aggregate sample (column 1) to the case where sep-
arate elasticities are estimated over the two program
regimes. We interact INREGA with log(Ei;t) to report
separate elasticities under SGRY and NREGA regimes.
All regressions are weighted by district-level population.
The standard errors reported in square brackets are clus-
tered at district level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 7: Stability of Estimates
Dependent variable: log(wi;t)
(1) (2)
More Ration  log(Ei;t) 0.087
[0.033]
Less Ration  log(Ei;t) 0.076
[0.029]
Low Exp  log(Ei;t) 0.087
[0.031]
High Exp  log(Ei;t) 0.072
[0.034]
All Controls Yes Yes
Observations 1493 1493
Adjusted R2 0.912 0.912
The rst column compares wage elasticities when we interact
log(Ei;t) with indicator variable Ration. Column 2 reports sep-
arate elasticities for the sample of districts below and above the
median value of average annual expenditure in a district. All
regressions are weighted by district-level population. The stan-
dard errors reported in square brackets are clustered at district
level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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